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Executive Summary / Abstract 
In our current state of events, namely in the aftermath of the crisis of 2008, we are 
witnesses of how quickly and widely the consequences of risky banking activities 
spread and contaminate the remaining sectors of the economy. 
Therefore it is necessary to analyze how the banking industry is currently 
regulated and what changes are needed in order to make it more stable and reliable, thus 
avoiding similar crisis in the future. 
This Work Project contributes to the literature on this subject but most 
importantly its purpose is to spark critical thinking and action on these subjects leading, 
hopefully, to improvements to the underlying economic system.
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Introduction 
When Capitalism was first implemented in Western cultures, it was a symbol of 
personal liberty and freedom of enterprise based on economic individualism. Adam 
Smith (1776) called it “the obvious and simple system of natural liberty” and defined it 
as the economic system that most allowed individuals to give expression to their true 
desires according to human nature. Its basic premise is that the pursuit of self-interest 
would automatically organize the economy according to the interests of the majority
2
. 
This economic system allowed the market to freely decide in which direction it 
would progress towards. And given that human Nature is flawed, this system is not 
without flaws too. Therefore, since capitalism was implemented, the global economy 
grew exponentially as the result of market pressure which reflected human ambition.
3
 
In what refers to the Banking Industry, banks needed to provide the liquidity the 
market required for this economic growth. So, the fractional reserve banking practice 
was created, which allowed banks to increase the money supply in the economy thus 
enabling all new ventures to take place, based on debt they issued. However, it was 
foreseen by several authors, such as Marx (1867) and Minsky (1986) that this system 
would be more prejudicial than benefic for the economy as a whole in the long term 
because the high rates of economic growth were unsustainable in a world with finite 
resources, thus it would lead unavoidably to a financial, economical, social and 
eventually an ideological crisis. 
                                                 
2
 The concept of the Invisible Hand describes the self-regulating nature of the marketplace. It was first 
employed by Adam Smith in the book IV, chapter II of The Wealth of Nations, and it is a result of action 
of forces present in the free trade market, such as self-interest, competition and supply and demand, 
which he noted as being capable of allocating resources in society. It is therefore, the basis of the laissez-
faire economic philosophy. 
3
 For an extensive discussion of financial system design, see Thakor (1996) and Allen and Gale (1998). 
A Study on Banking Regulation and the Implementation of the Basel II Accord in Portugal 
Jonathan C. Brum da Silva Masters in Management, # 419  6 
The existence of Banks4 
According to the economic model of Arrow–Debreu (1954) where markets are 
complete and frictionless, there would be no need for financial intermediaries such as 
banks, because investors and borrowers would be able to achieve efficient risk allocation 
on their own. This model, also researched by Modigliani and Miller (1958), only exists 
in theory due to the existence of financial market imperfections (deviations and frictions 
such as taxes, costs of financial distress, imperfections in the product markets, 
transaction costs and asymmetries of information). Therefore financial intermediaries 
are not only necessary but also valuable to our economic system in the perspective that 
they provide divisibility, risk transformation, capital liquidity and monitoring services 
(Bryant, 1980 and Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).
5
 
In classic theories of financial intermediation, such as Gurley and Shaw’s (1960), 
the main activity of intermediaries would be the transformation of deposits into diverse 
investments with lower risk than if the deposits were directly invested in the market. For 
example, a coalition of investors is able to build a more diversified portfolio, that is, one 
with lower risk than the portfolio each member would be able to build on its own. 
Contemporary theories of financial intermediation state that financial intermediaries 
emerge endogenously to solve the financial market imperfections mentioned earlier.
6
 
These institutions arise to exploit such market imperfections for economic gain. In other 
words, financial institutions begin where the conditions for the application of the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem end because they are able to profit from an imperfect market. 
                                                 
4
 Adapted from Santos, J. (2000), A Review of Literature. 
5
 See also Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) who derive a theory of financial intermediation based on the 
provision of liquidity services. Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) and Millon and Thakor (1985) provide 
explanations for the existence of financial intermediaries whose role is to produce information for resale. 
6
 For a review of earlier banking literature, see Santomero (1984). For a review of modern banking 
theory, see Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) and Freixas and Rochet (1997). 
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To Merton (1995), banks profit through the process of resource allocation, more 
specifically, capital allocation. The fact that banks are able to decide which investments 
should be financed and which should be dismissed raises some criticism regarding the 
power resulting from banks being able to interfere with the direction which the economy 
progresses to.
7
  Capital allocated by banks has been increasing more in the last 30 years 
than any other time in history, this derives directly from the fractional reserve banking 
practice, where banks are able to increase the money supply (create money) by issuing 
debt but not necessarily creating the same amount of real economic value. Critics, such 
as Fisher (1906), Knight (1999) and Friedman (2002), find it problematic that banks are 
able to “create money out of nothing”
8
, or without adding an equal amount of real value 
to the economy. In fact, banks do not really “create money out of nothing” because they 
create it against an asset. But that asset could be only a promise to pay back a debt. This 
may lead to financial bubbles in case the debts are not repaid. For example, the recent 
sub-prime crisis in the housing market was created mainly from financial institutions 
miss-assessing the value and risk of properties, bundling them together and re-selling 
them as securities not accurately graded thus creating a bubble which burst when 
borrowers were unable to repay their home mortgages (Morgenson, 2007). 
The practice of fractional reserve banking, currently applied by banks
,
 require 
banks to only keep a fraction of their deposits in reserve and are allowed to lend out the 
rest, while maintaining the simultaneous obligation to redeem all their deposits upon 
demand (Golin, 2001). This practice is universal in our banking system, it completely 
replaced the full-reserve banking practice previously in use and it has proven to have 
                                                 
7
 See Berger, Herring and Szegö (1995) for a discussion of the various roles of capital in banking firms. 
8
 “The modern banking system manufactures money out of nothing. The process is perhaps the most 
astounding piece of sleight of hand that was ever invented. Bankers own the Earth. Take it away from 
them but leave them the power to create money, and, with the flick of a pen, they will create enough 
money to buy it back again. (...) If you wish to remain slaves of Bankers and pay the cost of your own 
slavery, let them continue.” Sir Josiah Stamp, president of the Bank of England, 1928. 
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several benefits for the modern economy, the most important one was providing higher 
liquidity to the market which is the main element that allowed our economy to grow so 
quickly since the use of this practice. But there are also several negative effects, the 
most evident and already mentioned effect is that the increase in money supply does not 
reflect an equal increase in real value but only an increase in debt.  
The following figure I (detailed in annex 1) show the increase of global debt from 
1980 to 2008 and the increase of global money supply from 1970 to 2008.  
 
Figure I 
From figure I we can clearly verify the reason that led many researchers to 
denominate our monetary system as a debt based monetary system, there is a direct 
relationship between global debt and global money supply. Critics of fractional reserve 
banking claim that the system is inherently destructive and inevitably generates 
debasement of currency, extreme inequality due to enlargement of the gap between 
classes, increase countries fragility to financial speculation and periodic economical 
crisis, which will continuously escalate in size and impact (Marx, 1867). The virtually 
unlimited growth in the money supply leads to unsustainable financial bubbles in capital 
markets, because the market reacts to speculation by adjusting financial value to reflect 
real value created in the economy. 
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To Douthwaite (1999), as the money supply grows, the economy becomes 
increasingly indebted due to the fact that debt grows in parallel with money supply, and 
increasing interest payments are needed to repay the debt, requiring future generations to 
continue to pay debts contracted from the previous ones. To some, this implies that debt 
must grow exponentially in order for the monetary system to remain solvent thus being 
virtually impossible to be repaid.
9
 According to Rowbotham (1998), this system creates 
other severe externalities. He argues that inflationary exponential growth in the economy 
discourages savings because money is continuously decreasing in value, therefore 
individuals have an incentive to spend more before their money is affected by inflation 
thus consuming more and keeping our economy running, which leads to 
environmentally damaging and unsustainable over-consumption hence depleting natural 
resources of our planet in the long term. “The world used debt to accelerate its 
consumption. Spending that would have taken place normally over a period of many 
years was squeezed into a relatively short period because of the availability of cheap 
borrowings.” (Satyajit Das, 2009) Rowbotham argues that the indebted are forced to 
induce new consumers to spend their way into debt, in order for existing loans to be 
repaid with new debt-created money, therefore creating a never ending debt cycle. 
To some economists, such as Minsky (1986), this system continuously fosters new 
debt consumers, which brings more liquidity to the market provided by the money 
supply continuously created but also leads to inflated financial products that do not 
reflect real economic value causing financial bubbles to occur. Once these bubbles burst, 
banks are able to harvest a large number of assets through widespread foreclosure or 
bankruptcy. Some critics argue that in the long term banks will be able to hold debt on 
                                                 
9
 “We are completely dependent on the commercial banks. Someone has to borrow every dollar we have 
in circulation. If the banks create ample synthetic money we are prosperous; if not, we starve. (...) When 
one gets a complete grasp of the picture, the tragic absurdity of our hopeless situation is almost incredible. 
It is the most important subject intelligent persons can investigate and reflect upon.” Robert H. Hemphill, 
Credit Manager of the Federal Reserve of Atlanta during the Great Depression, 1934. 
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all existing assets due to the exponential nature of fractional reserve banking. Under our 
current debt-based monetary system, banking institutions are able to hold a tight grip on 
the economy through financial dependence, for example, the case of Greece in 2009 / 
2010 shows how governments are affected by the decrease of credit availability. In this 
case Greece got under severe social pressure and life conditions deteriorated 
considerably due to the fact that the government did not have access to international 
funding to be able to maintain its public services functioning properly. This example is 
evidence to the level of dependency our economy has on money supply originated by 
debt. 
 
But this practice is so widespread that our current economy grew based on this 
easily accessible money supply that financial intermediaries became the financiers of all 
other productive activities, and it would be impossible to change the fractional reserve 
banking without dramatically changing the way our economy functions.  
As a result of fractional reserve banking, risk in the system is bound to rise 
causing the system to be increasingly unstable due to the increase of money supply 
without an equal increase in real economic value. Regarding banks, the main risk banks 
incur is credit risk
10
 when they issue loans, if it is not properly assessed and a large 
amount of borrowers are not able to repay their loans then deposits could not be assured 
and the entire system would suffer on a large scale. This is why correct credit risk 
assessment is of vital importance for our economic system to continue to function 
properly 
                                                 
10
 “Credit risk arises because banks’ customers or counterparties may not be willing or able to fulfil their 
contractual obligations.” Barclays bank, annual report, 2000 
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Trust: the key element 
The fact that in fractional reserve banking a bank is required to keep a reserve of 
its deposits is going to constrain the amount of money creation that occurs in the 
banking system, and guarantees that banks have enough available capital to meet normal 
demand withdrawals. Problems may arise when the demand depositors would attempt to 
withdraw more money than the bank has in reserves, leading to a bank run or when 
problems are extreme and widespread a systemic crisis may occur. The event of a bank 
run may cause the bank to suffer a liquidity crisis and to perhaps default. To mitigate 
these problems, central banks generally regulate and oversee commercial banks; they 
insure the deposits of commercial banks’ customers and also act as lenders of last resort. 
An analysis of a bank run indicates that depositors will only cause a bank run 
when they have a genuine fear of loss of capital.
11
 For this reason trust by the public is 
of the utmost importance for the banking system, and it is ensured by the two following 
main premises:  
1. Depositors assets protection 
2. Security, efficiency and widespread acceptance of the payment system 
 
The first point is ensured by central banks regulation which ensures that banks do 
not engage in activities with a level of risk that jeopardizes depositors assets. Banks 
must not make too risky investments, given that the stability of the entire system relies 
on trust. The recent crisis of 2008 shows the scale of consequences that arise from 
investment decisions with a high level of risk. To Peter Mottek (2009), CEO of Barclays 
Bank, Banking needs to go back to basics, it should only make investments which it 
understands and it should have a more conservative position regarding the market. 
Banks should, in this perspective, have an accurate method to measure the risk they 
                                                 
11
 See Calomiris and Gorton (1991) for a review of the literature on bank panics. 
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incur when they issue a loan (credit risk) thus assuring that the loan will be repaid and 
the debt based system may be able to continue to function properly. 
The second point refers to the payment system, in modern society all currency is 
fiat currency meaning that money is no longer backed by a real asset, such as gold or 
silver. Money does not represent any real value except debt of another party. The only 
tangible aspect of the monetary system is the borrower’s promise to pay back the loan 
plus an interest. Debt and the ability of borrowers to service that debt becomes currency 
itself, which is represented by the bills and coins we use and are widely accepted as 
legal tender. The payment system is therefore also very dependent on trust. 
For these reasons, a collapse in confidence in the solvency of the banking system 
is the most feared issue the banking system faces. 
Defining the Problem 
“Where do banks get the money to lend? They get it [mostly] from people who 
open accounts. Banks act as go-betweens for people who save and people who want to 
borrow. If savers didn’t put their money in banks, the banks would have little or no 
money to lend. The money doesn’t belong to the bank’s president, board of directors, or 
stockholders. It belongs to you and the other depositors. That’s why bankers have a 
special obligation not to take big risks when they make loans.”
12
 
As presented in the citation above, a problem arises when banks do not manage 
credit risk effectively. When a bank issues a relatively high amount of loans and does 
not hold a necessary reserve to guarantee its solvency it immediately decreases the 
confidence consumers have in it. 
                                                 
12
 Quote from the Banking Basics booklet, published by Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 2007. 
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Therefore banks need to be regulated in order to prevent the externalities derived 
from banking failures. This is the problem, to ensure that banks do not engage in 
increasingly riskier activities and that they act in the best interest of all its stakeholders 
(John and Saunders, 1994) in order to maintain trust in the banking system thus 
preventing its collapse. 
According to Boyd, Chank and Smith (1998) the stability of the banking system 
must be assured through regulation. 
Banking Regulation 
To Santos (2000), the need for banking regulation results from the existence of 
market failures, he presents two main arguments to justify the need for banking 
regulation, systemic crisis and the impossibility of depositors to monitor bank 
operations. To Freixas and Rochet (1997), the main argument resides in the need to 
assure a safety net that allows the protection of depositors’ assets from a risk or failure 
on the banks side.
13
 
In economic terms, there is a consensus regarding the fact that the failure of a bank 
may trigger contagious externalities to the remaining economy
14
 but there is no 
consensus regarding the real reason why banks need to be regulated and, as such, there 
are doubts and several proposals referring the optimal way they should be regulated. 
Some authors, such as Briones and Rockoff (2005), favor the absence of 
regulation as the optimal scenario, the so called free-banking
15
, stating that the invisible 
hand would allow the banking industry to regulate itself, reaching efficiency. The main 
                                                 
13
 See Goodhart et al (1998), Chapter 1, for other rationales on banking regulation. 
14
 Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont (1999) show how the failure of one bank may trigger a contagious run 
on other banks in a model with multiple competing banks and an interbank market. 
15
 See Dowd (1996) and Benston and Kaufman (1996), who dispute of the arguments often presented in 
defense of bank regulation. 
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criticism to this approach is that given the vital role of banking institutions in our 
economy, severe externalities would arise in case they were to fail. 
Other authors, such as La Porta, 2002 and Dougherty, 2008, favor the very 
opposite, a state owned banking system, considering banking a public service such as 
health or education. But the majority of authors defend the in between solution, privately 
owned banks and state owned banks competing in a free market but both subjected to 
heavy regulations. 
Section Transition Remarks 
In the first section of the Work Project, a bibliographical review of the main 
positions and theories regarding the banking system was made, presenting the concept 
of bank and the main practices used by banks in modern economy. This section also 
presented the main arguments regarding the need for banking regulations such as, 
market failures and asymmetries of information. The miss-management of the credit 
risk a bank incurs as a result of its operations may result in extreme externalities for not 
only to the economy but also to society as a whole which is the main reason for the need 
of its accurate regulation. 
The most up-to-date regulations regarding credit risk are specified in the Basel II 
Accord, which will be the focus of the next section of this paper. 
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Global Historical Evolution towards Basel II Accord 
Basel I 
With the end of the Great Depression of the 1930’s, concerns about the 
supervision and regulation of the banking system became increasingly present. 
According to Kapstein (1994), several banks established measures to guarantee their 
performance even in times of systemic shocks. Despite this, the globalization of 
markets translated into the fact that institutions of one country would have impact in 
institutions of another country. In this way, internal regulators (national) would see their 
power restricted. This, associated with the bankruptcies in the banking industry  
occurred in the 70’s (Herstatt Bank, Germany; British-Israel Bank of London, UK and 
Ambrosiano Bank in 1982), caused the concept of globalization to be associated with 
liquidity and solvency problems of banks which operated in more than one country. 
The creation of new financial instruments, namely asset securitization which is 
the tool by which traditional banking assets and credits which have a collateral 
associated (such as a mortgage) are transformed into transactionable bonds allowing a 
bank to transfer the risk associated with the underlying credit, increasing the number of 
counterparts in banking operations which ultimately made it more complex and difficult 
to accurately assess the risk of banking operations. 
 
According to Goodhart, Hofman and Segoviano (2004), these three factors, the 
globalization of markets, the economic crisis occurred in some countries in the 70’s 
and 80’s and the increased complexity of the banking industry reinforced the 
necessity of intervention and supervision measures at an international level. In this 
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sense, the Basel Committee
16
 was created, and it gathered for the first time in 1975 in 
the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) in Basel. Its main goal was to mitigate the 
differences between national supervision systems and to improve their quality by 
developing new supervision approaches, and also revising the economic capital 
requirements
17
 that would ensure the solvency of the banking system. 
The Basel Committee published in July 1988 its first document that attempted to 
standardize capital requirements for banks in G10 countries, the Basel I accord: 
International Convergence Measurement and Capital Standards (BIS I).This 
accord introduced minimum capital requirements of 8%, weighted by the credit risk a 
bank incurred (Risk Weighted Assets, RWA). The credit risk was measured using a 
standard method indifferent for all banks and external to them. During the 
implementation of BIS I and due to market changes and adaptations, the accord suffered 
continuous amendments leading ultimately to the creation of a Basel II accord, which 
are summarized in the figure II (for a more detailed timeline see annex 2): 
 
                                                 
16
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), created in 1974 inside the Bank for International  
Settlements (BIS), and established by the central-bank Governors of ten countries (Belgium, Canada,  
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland , United Kingdom  
and United States), provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters. (BIS). 
17
 “Economic Capital is the capital banks set aside as buffer against potential losses inherent in a 
particular business activity, [considering] how much risk an individual transaction contributes to the 
bank’s portfolio of risks.” (KPMG, 2004). 
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Unexpected events resulting from Basel I accord 
Financial institutions increased their risk appetite.
18
 BIS I 
implemented risk weighted capital requirements therefore financial 
institutions pursued alternatives investment options with higher 
risk but which enabled them to maximize their return without increasing the need for 
higher capital reserves (see figure III and annex 3 for the detailed graph). 
Credit Crunch. The introduction of BIS I capital requirements led to a credit 
contraction due to decrease of liquidity by financial institutions which resulted from the 
immediate increase in capital reserves held by banks. 
Asset securitization on a mass scale.
19
 Under BIS I banks automatically reduced 
their revenue, this resulted from the fact that they had less liquidity available to issue 
loans and make investments, therefore banks created increasingly complex products 
which grouped several loans into bundles and separated them into bonds, rated by 
recognized rating agencies, thereafter they were placed in the market to be purchased 
(Berger, 1995). These bonds allowed banks to receive additional revenue from their 
loans. In 2008, the credibility of these recognized rating agencies suffered a blow when 
the sub-prime bubble bursted. 
Artificial decrease of risk and risk avoidance strategies. Matten (2000) defends 
that, under BIS I regulations, banks had an incentive to reduce their risk in order to be 
able to provide more competitive credit conditions to customers. Banks achieved this 
                                                 
18
 Blum (1999) shows that capital regulation may lead to an increase in bank’s riskiness but in a dynamic 
framework. This allows for the consideration of capital standards’ intertemporal effects. If it is too costly 
for the bank to raise equity to meet higher capital standards tomorrow, an alternative is to increase risk 
today. As Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) also show, it is possible theoretically that risk- based capital 
reserves will induce greater risk-taking. Once the capital requirement, bankers may respond by taking 
greater risk in an attempt to earn their 'required' return. 
19
 “Basel I is not about risk, it is about costs, in fact, a particular class of cost, the one associated to 
compliance to regulations. What matters is that regulatory costs should be roughly similar among banks 
operating in the same (international) markets. Competitive success should be a matter of private virtues, 
not of regulatory advantages. In fact, ironically, Basel I itself stimulated banks to shift their activities 
towards securities markets to reduce the burden of compliance with regulation.” Carvalho, 2005. 
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through securitizations and the use of derivatives which artificially decreased their 
overall risk by offering financial collaterals and by passing the risk on to investors but it 
did not represent a real reduction of risks in the overall financial system, on the 
contrary, the existence of more counterparts increased the uncertainty and the 
probability of one of them defaulting. 
The New Basel Accord 
Even though BIS I was widely implemented (over 100 countries by 2006) it did 
not achieve its main goal of making the whole financial system stable and solvent. 
Following the distortions created by the Basel I Accord in 1988, as well as the financial 
market transformations which made the risk profile of financial institutions increasingly 
complex. The Committee became continuously concerned with the negative effects that 
a potential failure of one bank would have in the economy as a whole, due to 
counterparty contagion. So in June 1999 the Basel Committee made a full scale revision 
of the accord, which was improved in January 2001 and again in April 2003. The Basel 
Committee published a final version of the accord which was officially titled 
“International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A 
Revised Framework”, this accord had two approaches for capital requirements, a 
revised standard approach which banks had to implement until the end of 2006 and an 
Internal Rating Based (IRB) approach which banks were allowed to implement starting 
in January 2007
20
. 
                                                 
20 The table in annex 4 shows the main differences between Basel I and Basel II accord. 
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Basel II 
The Basel II Accord has the following overall structure (detailed in annex 5):  
Figure IV 
The core pillar, Pillar 1, refers to capital adequacy requirements, the topic 
covered by BIS I. BIS I obligated banks to hold 8% of capital in reserve, this reserve 
was mandatory for all banks in order for them to be compliant with BIS I and it was 
decided externally to banks, not analyzing the specific risk each bank incurred.  
In Basel II, “three methods are proposed to calculate capital requirements 
according to the credit risk effectively accepted by a bank. The standard method is an 
improvement over the 1988 table of credit risk. Instead of pre-assigning arbitrary risk 
weights to classes of assets, they shall be set according to evaluations of risk made by 
rating companies or other institutions empowered to do this kind of assessment. The 
other two methods involve risk evaluations prepared at least in part by the bank itself, 
and are called Internal Risk Based (IRB). The foundation IRB method allows banks to 
use as inputs to the calculation of capital requirements their own estimates of the 
probabilities of default for each class of assets. The other necessary inputs in the case of 
the foundation approach are to be supplied by the supervisor. The advanced IRB 
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approach, in contrast, allows the bank also to use its estimates of losses and exposure 
given default as inputs in the calculation of capital coefficients.”
21
 
 
The IRB approach requires a bank to possess in house risk assessment expertise 
and overall financial sophistication. Under the IRB approach, banks with lower risk 
portfolios (e.g. AAA credit risk rating) will be able to hold less reserves and free more 
capital, which is their incentive to implement it (a practical example of how the capital 
reserves for a 100€ deposit vary under the different approaches is available in the table 
in annex 6). 
 Besides the credit risk and the market risk
22
, the Basel II Accord recognizes the 
importance of operational risk
23
. However the degree of guidance in measurement of 
this risk is far below the level of complexity for the calculation of the credit risk.
24
 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of operational risk is a fundamental improvement over BIS 
I, given that operational risk events are not frequent but when they occur they are often 
of considerable proportions. Although contemplating more risks in the calculation of 
capital reserves held by banks, Basel II still does not reflect the full scale of risk 
incurred by banks. Hence, some critics argue that under Basel II, the financial system 
will never be stable and moreover it will bring a false perspective of safety because 
banks will have reserves, but these will not guarantee their solvency. 
                                                 
21
 For a more extensive description see the full working paper by Carvalho, 2005. 
22
 “Market risk is defined as the risk of losses in on and off-balance-sheet positions arising from 
movements in market prices. The risks subject to this requirement are: i) The risks pertaining to interest 
rate related instruments and equities in the trading book; and ii) Foreign exchange risk and commodities 
risk throughout the bank” (BCBS, 2006, pp. 157). 
23
 “Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
people and systems or from external events. This definition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and 
reputation risk” (BCBS, pp. 144). 
24
 The level of complexity of the calculation of credit risk reflects the weight it has on banks’ capital 
requirements. For example, in Portugal credit risk capital requirement represented 90,2% of total capital 
requirement by 2008. As can be seen  in the table in annex 7. 
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The Pillar 2 of the accord refers to Supervisory Review which “is intended to 
ensure that banks have adequate capital to support all the risks in their business. (…) 
Supervisors are expected to evaluate how well banks are assessing their capital needs 
relative to their risks and intervene, where appropriate.” (Basel II, 2006). Even though 
Basel II contemplates a supervisory review, supervisors will not be able to accurately 
evaluate if the models reflect the risk banks incur and that the resulting capital amounts 
are adequate because the models used by banks are generated internally and likely to be 
too complex and opaque for external supervisors to monitor. 
 Nevertheless, Pillar 2 envisions that banks will pursue more stable positions and 
assure their solvability by reducing the overall risk they incur. By doing this, banks will 
be able to lower their risk rating thus being able to hold smaller capital reserves and 
therefore offering credit products at more competitive prices. If banks start to deviate 
from stable positions and do not ensure their solvency there are sanctions in place, but 
the purpose of these sanctions is not to punish the banks, but to provide incentives for 
bankers to turn the bank around and return to stronger and more stable capital positions. 
The final pillar, Pillar 3, is intended “to complement the minimum capital 
requirements (Pillar 1) and the supervisory review process (Pillar 2) [and] to encourage 
market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements which will allow 
market participants to assess the capital adequacy of the institution” (Basel II, 2006). 
Given that the determination of capital requirements involve internal models and, as 
such, are less transparent it became necessary to allow the market to have access to 
more information regarding banks operations. Market participants can be key allies of 
the regulators by penalizing institutions that take excessive risks. For market discipline 
to be effective, however, market participants must be adequately informed about the 
risks banks are taking. Therefore banks must make available information regarding risk 
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management methodologies, capital reserve levels and portfolio risk analysis. Although 
what is promoted by this pillar, the goal of transparency is not achieved because Basel 
II does not contemplate accurately all risk incurred by banks so the information 
provided by banks will never reflect all risk they incur.
25
 
The Portuguese Case 
The Portuguese financial system is significantly exposed to the risks of global 
financial instability. Firstly, the Portuguese economy financed, since 1974, a 
considerable portion of its expansion by resourcing to international credit markets. 
Which increased the liquidity available in the Portuguese market, and people started 
changing their habits by resourcing more to debt for the purchase of goods and 
services.
26
 Due to this fact, the Portuguese population has suffered a decrease in private 
financing capacity, which has direct consequences on the standard of living of the 
population given that they are continuously indebted making it difficult to break free 
from the debt cycle.
27 
Secondly, the Portuguese financial system develops its activity 
integrated in an open economy, with strong exposition to external factors. In this way, 
disturbances in the international financial system and a global debt contraction affect 
severely the functioning of the Portuguese economy. 
Given the tendency of resourcing to credit for investments and purchases, the 
Portuguese economy became increasingly indebted. Consequently, as in any system 
based in debt, the market adjusts periodically to reflect real economic value created in 
                                                 
25 
Llewellyn (2001) suggests in the Theory of the Second Best that accurate risk assessment is achievable 
only in theory. Therefore capital requirements will never be able to make banking fully stable due to the 
ever present uncertainty in the market. Hence, he proposes a solution which focuses on the strengthening 
instead of Pillars 2 and 3. 
26 
The graph in annex 8 shows an increase in private debt as a percentage of income from approximately 
80% to 140% during the period 2000 – 2008. 
27
 The graph in annex 9 shows the decrease in Portuguese private financing capacity, savings and 
investments during 1995 – 2008. 
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the economy. These adjustments, lead unavoidably to credit contractions which cause 
the default rate on credits to increase. During the period ranging from 1999 to 2009, 
credit default rate in the Portuguese private sector increased roughly from 1,9% to 5%.
28
 
Having this scenario of increased credit risk, the Bank of Portugal enforced the 
implementation of Basel II regulations in order to make banks’
29
 capital requirements 
reflect accurately the risk they incurred, thus reducing the credit risk and consequently 
the credit default rate. This would allow the debt based monetary system to continue to 
function properly, but several questions arise from this solution:  
 Can a consequence of this mean that banks will own an increasingly higher 
number of assets resulting from periodical market adjustments and credit 
contractions? 
 Is this not just a temporary solution given the fact that the foundation of the 
system is prone to further crisis? 
 Will this solution increase the gap between economic classes due to the fact that 
banks will only have incentives to give credit to good rating borrowers? 
Nevertheless, capital requirements are extremely important for immediate 
financial stability, given that they reduce the possibility of a failure in the banking 
system. In effect, the cases of banking insolvency registered in the past translated in 
high costs for tax payers and accentuated economic instability, with reflexes such as 
increase of unemployment rates. In this context, the Basel II accord started to be 
implemented in Portugal. 
All banks operating in Portugal were compliant with Basel II’s capital 
requirements standard approach by 2006.
30
 But this, approach did not represent a 
                                                 
28
 See annex 10 for evidence of the credit default rate increase. 
29
 For a definition of Bank used in Portugal see annex 11. 
30
 Annex 7 shows that by December 2008, still 100% of capital requirements for Portuguese banks were 
calculated using the standard approach. 
A Study on Banking Regulation and the Implementation of the Basel II Accord in Portugal 
Jonathan C. Brum da Silva Masters in Management, # 419  24 
significant improvement over BIS I approach given that credit risk was still assessed 
externally from banks. However, the IRB approach represented a considerable 
improvement regarding risk assessment because it allowed banks to assess risk 
internally. Nevertheless, some critics argue that the IRB approach requires an extremely 
high level of sophistication of the internal systems used by banks and that it is too 
complex to be monitored. (Carvalho, 2005) 
The Espírito Santo Financial Group (ESFG) was the first banking group in 
Portugal to be authorized by the Bank of Portugal to start applying the IRB approach for 
risk assessment. Bank of Portugal considered the group fully compliant with the IRB 
approach on March, 2009, this includes, on an individual level, Banco do Espírito 
Santo, Banco do Espírito Santo Investimento, Banco BEST and Banco do Espírito 
Santo dos Açores. Banco Comercial Português was authorized to apply the IRB 
approach shortly after, and currently Barclays Bank Portugal and Caixa Geral de 
Depósitos are undergoing the IRB approach implementation process. 
Banks have an incentive to implement the IRB approach because this means that 
they are able to hold smaller capital reserves, thus freeing up more capital and therefore 
being able to offer better pricing conditions on their products and be more competitive 
regarding other banks. This is their main objective, but for the Bank of Portugal the 
main sought after effect of the implementation of the IRB approach is that banks will 
have more conservative positions regarding risk thus making the Portuguese banking 
system more stable as a whole. 
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Final Conclusions 
Following the Basel II Accord publication and implementation, the main direct 
impacts it had in the banking industry were: 
From Pillar 1, Basel II gave the stimulus for banks to create sophisticated internal 
risk assessment models thus not relying on external rating agencies (Gouveia, 2010). 
This increased the sensitivity of risk assessment. Nevertheless, given the crisis that 
begun in 2008, some banks state the models are already obsolete and therefore the high 
cost of implementing them does not make economic sense. Another argument against 
Pillar 1, is the fact that it is procyclical.
31
 
From Pillar 2, banking institutions (i) mobilized more resources to analyze the 
risks they incur; (ii) measured more accurately the impact of potential losses arising 
from those risks; and (iii) resorted to risk mitigation instruments. 
From Pillar 3, a higher level of banks’ information was made available to the 
markets, thus making banking more market responsive due to market pressures. But the 
goal of increasing trust and credibility in the banking system was not fully achieved. 
Basel II implementation and all banking regulations, for this effect, have 
ramifications that reach far beyond the community of large banks, it affects the way 
banks finance all other productive activities and private individuals. Given the scale of 
implications that banking regulations have, in my opinion there are three key objectives 
to be addressed: (i) improve the role of strong independent supervisors
32
; (ii) create 
simpler, broader and up-to date regulations; and (iii) create crisis management systems 
                                                 
31
 Procyclicality refers to the exaggeration of upturns and downturns caused by the changes in capital 
reserves as a result of considering that there is less risk in the market in growth phases thus decreasing the 
capital reserves held by banks and fuelling the growth. And the opposite happens in a downturn, when 
banks hold higher reserves thus accelerating the effects of the crunch. (Gordy, 2004). 
32
 In my opinion, regulators and supervisors should be independent and operate having benefits for the 
community as a whole in mind, and  not subjected to pressures from the banking industry. 
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that define ex-ante the procedures and role of all intervening elements during a crisis 
thus avoiding costly emergency bailouts. 
 
Moreover, debates and most importantly action, should take place to shape a new 
economy with a structure provides more benefits than externalities to the society as a 
whole. Political bodies must be imbued with economic knowledge and comprehension 
that enables them to create policies which control money and credit in a sustainable 
way.  
“We have to inform people that (…) money can be their master, or money can be 
their servant. People can be sovereign, or they can be slaves. Right now we are slaves to 
a debt based money system”
33
 
Recommendations 
When I first started to learn how our economy worked, I was quite puzzled, 
astonished and skeptical. I realized that something was deeply wrong with the core 
foundation of our economic system. Perhaps in a way similar, to when Galileo started to 
compare the geocentric model, widely accepted in his period, against his telescope 
observations, which proved him that the model was wrong and Earth was not at the 
center of the Universe. We may be alluding ourselves in believing that our economic 
system and the standard of living it accustomed us to, will prevail forever. 
Sigmund Freud once said that “illusions commend themselves to us because they 
save us pain and allow us to enjoy pleasure instead. We must therefore accept it without 
complaint when they sometimes collide with a bit of reality against which they are 
dashed to pieces.” The global crisis was the reality on which the fake pleasures of a debt 
                                                 
33
 Speech given by Connie Fogal at the Bromsgrove Group conference on monetary reform, 2004, United 
Kingdom. 
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based economy were smashed (Das, 2009). This crisis is an economic and financial 
process that cannot be easily undone. It is an about face resulting from the pyramiding 
of debt over decades and continuous economic unsustainable expansion. It may be the 
climax of capitalism that Marx (1867) theorized about, after which will come times of 
extreme economic and social duress. But can there be a solution, or must the system we 
currently operate in be deeply changed? 
 
A solution for this crisis may encompass some similar measures applied during 
the Great Depression of the 1930’s. This solution derives directly from the law of the 
Survival of the Fittest (Darwin, 1864) applied to economics, “where in an economic 
downturn the declining business simply fail and economic resources are reallocated to 
successful businesses so that the winners get the economy going again.”
34
 This basic 
principle provides enough incentive for a capitalistic economy to function. However, 
the problem is that, under this system, banks inevitably will focus in remaining 
competitive due to the existing profit incentive. La Porta, 2002 and Dougherty, 2008 
suggest that banks should, therefore, not be part of the free market given the importance 
of the traditional services they provide have in our economy
35
.They should, therefore, 
be a state provided service similar to health or education. Their function should be to 
satisfy public needs regarding banking services, and not be a burden to our existence. 
This may be an extreme approach, but given the proportions of the crisis, it is worth 
analyzing more thoroughly. 
                                                 
34
 Reizner, John in U.S. Economic Future: May We Lose Complete Control over our Destiny, 2009 
35
 A very simple explanation of the role of banks in our economy is provided by :"The core job of our 
financial system is to convert your savings into investments. When it works well, you deposit money in 
the bank and the bank lends that money to a factory, which builds a new line that employs your cousin, 
who then has money to put in a bank, which then funds some high-tech start-up that comes up with some 
new innovation. This process is amazing [when] it works very well. 
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As Mottek (2009) suggests, banking needs to go back to basics. Basic banking 
services should be ensured by the state and other riskier banking activities, (such as 
hedge funds, financial products market investments) which only create financial value 
and not real economic value, should be separated from traditional banking. Traditional 
banking should be limited to their initial activities (such as holding deposits, and issuing 
loans). They should not be permitted to invest in the financial products markets. By 
employing this measure, if an investment bank were to fail, it would not contaminate 
the traditional banking system thus not requiring a public bailout to ensure depositors 
assets. On the other side, free market would make investment banks efficient, penalizing 
whoever would be responsible for gross negligence because their positions would no 
longer be ensured by public bailouts for too big to fail institutions. 
Nevertheless, it does not matter how many measures we implement, we will not 
regain control over the global economic system if we first do not regain control over our 
personal finances. If we reduced our personal need for debt, banks would never have 
gained the weight they possess in our economy. Ever since credit has been made easily 
available through fractional reserve banking, consumption has experienced an 
unmatched increase. But since the money supply growth was purely of a financial 
nature the market was bound to adjust to real economic value.
36
 The vision of 
Capitalism was freedom of enterprise for all and a self-regulating market that would 
satisfy all the needs of society, but it led to an undesired result, a debt based global 
economy which holds a tight grip on human life. 
I believe that the only true solution is not to focus on constant economic growth, 
and implement policies towards a more slow paced, reasoned economy. We need a 
                                                 
36
 Under our current economic system, it is believed that strong employment, low inflation and increasing 
consumer spending will keep the economy growing. But this growth is merely monetary and it does not 
encompass quality of life, more time with our loved ones or healthier lifestyles. In my opinion, the more 
we consume, more natural resources are needed to meet our demand which translates into deforestation, 
higher concentration of CO2 in the air we breed and in general, a planet in worst condition. 
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monetary system that does not rely on debt. This means of course, reducing 
consumption rate, because there will not be the same levels of liquidity in the market as 
before. Therefore this solution must begin with a change of lifestyles. 
Perhaps, the foundation of capitalism, the profit incentive and growth driven 
mindset should be put into question and a possible replacement could be a 
sustainability driven mindset. But any change that is to take place must start with each 
one of us, if we change our World, the World will change. 
 
Are you part of the solution, or are you part of the problem? 
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Annexes 
The annexes are not essential for the comprehension of this Work Project. They 
serve the purpose of presenting additional information to specific points in the Work 
Project. 
A Study on Banking Regulation and the Implementation of the Basel II Accord in Portugal 
Jonathan C. Brum da Silva Masters in Management, # 419  37 
Annex 1: Global Debt and Money Supply relationship 
Source: Adapted from Federal Reserve of the US, Data Series Quarterly 
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Annex 2: Basel II Timeline 
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Annex 3: Tendency towards riskier banking activities 
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Annex 4: Main differences between Basel I and Basel II accords 
Source: Adapted from Pereira (2003) 
 
Basel I Accord Basel II Accord 
Single external model for 
capital requirement 
computation applied to all 
financial institutions, 
weighting credit risk 
Flexible external and/or internal 
model leading to three different 
approaches weighting three 
different risk variables 
To define capital 
requirements, the supervisor 
establishes a percentage over 
the asset value 
Banks may use internal 
information systems to define 
an assets risk, being required to 
report to the supervisor 
regarding the methodology used 
Based on a single measure 
weighting credit risk 
Uses internally developed 
methods, validated by a Central 
Bank, making information 
available to the market 
Reduced risk sensitivity. 
Considered first only credit 
risk, and market risk with the 
1996 amendment 
Increased risk sensitivity. 
Considers credit, market and 
operational risk 
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Annex 5: Basel II Accord structure 
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Annex 6: Capital Requirement variations for a €100 Loan 
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Annex 7: Portuguese Banking System Data 
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Annex 8: Private Debt and Interest paid 
 
 
Annex 9: Private Financing Capacity, Savings and Investments 
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Annex 10: Credit default rate in Portuguese private sector 
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Annex 11: The definition of Bank used in Portugal 
Source: Ministério Público (1992, 1996, 2002) 
The law “Decreto-Lei  nº  298/92,  de  31  de  Dezembro,  do  Regime  Gera l  das  Instituições  de 
Crédito e  Sociedades Financeiras  (RGICSF)”, refers the five pillars of the financial integration of the 
European Community (EC): 
 Freedom of financial enterprises establishment 
 Freedom to provide services by the previously mentioned enterprises 
 Harmonization and mutual recognition of National regulations 
 Freedom of capital circulation 
 Monetary economic union 
 
This “Decreto-Lei”, which was afterwards modified by the “ Decreto-Lei  nº  232/96,  de  5  de 
Dezembro” and more recently by the “ Decreto-Lei  nº  201/2002,  de   26  de  Setembro”, defines in its 
article no. 2, credit institutions as enterprises which activity consists in receiving deposits or other 
reimbursable funds from the public, to be applied through credit issuance or other regulated and allowed 
operations. Credit institutions also include enterprises which issue payments in electronic currency. The 
activities allowed by credit institutions are regulated in the article no. 4 of the RGICSF. 
Article no. 9 details which operations do not constitute reimbursable funds received from the 
public. Article no. 3 from the RGICSF establishes the entities which are to be considered credit 
institutions in Portugal: 
a) Banks 
b) Economic Intermediaries (Caixas Económicas) 
c) Mutual Agriculture Credit Institutions (A  Caixa   Central  de  Crédito  Agrícola  Mútuo  e  as  
caixas  de  crédito  agrícola mútuo 
d) Credit Financial Institutions 
e) Investment Societies 
f) Financial Allocation Societies 
g) Factoring Societies 
h) Financial Societies for Credit Acquisition 
i) Mutual Guarantee Institutions 
j) Electronic Currency Institutions 
k) Other enterprises which qualify as such according to the article no.2 
